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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 20030867-CA 
vs. : 
JEAN MALLOW, : Argument Priority 
: Classification Number Two (2) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Conviction for the offense of Distribution 
of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), before the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, Judge, presiding. Utah Code Annotated 
78-21-3(f) confers jurisdiction upon the court of Appeals to hear this Appeal. 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 
The above-captioned matter is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and 
sentence in a criminal matter wherein the death penalty was not imposed. Therefore, 
pursuant to the terms and provisions of Rule 29(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it 
should be assigned an Argument Priority Classification Number of Two (2). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether counsel for Defendant had a conflict herein in representing both 
Defendant and the chief witness against Defendant. The standard of review is set forth in 
State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190 (Utah, 1991). Appellate Issued preserved at Tr. 90-91. 
2. Whether the trial court erred herein in sentencing Defendant-Appellant 
without benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report, and absent authentic, current information 
regarding Defendant. The standard of review is set forth in State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853 
(Utah S.Ct, 1994). Appellate Issue preserved at Sentencing Tr. pp 3-9. 
3. Whether the evidence presented at trial herein was legally sufficient to support 
conviction of Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of review is whether 
the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307. Appellate issue preserved at Tr. 143. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
An interpretation of the following and below cited Constitutional provisions, 
Statutes, and Rules is determinative of the issues herein presented: 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment VI, U.S. Constitution. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, 58-37-8(l)(a)ii. 
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RULES 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
As required by the terms and provisions of Rule 24(1 )(b) and Rule 24(f), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the within Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are 
herein reproduced and incorporated into the Addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a direct Appeal from a final judgment of conviction and sentence in a 
criminal case made and entered by the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Grand 
County, State of Utah, Moab City Department, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District 
Court Judge, presiding. 
In this case, Defendant was convicted, upon jury trial had on September 26, 2003, 
of the offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8 (1953, as amended). On October 7,2003, 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration in the Utah State 
Prison of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years, said sentence to run 
consecutive to any other sentence imposed by any other state, and fined eighteen hundred 
and fifty dollars ($1,850.00). Defendant is currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison 
serving said sentence. 
The date of imposition of Sentence herein was October 7, 2003. The Notice of 
Appeal was filed on October 31, 2003. No Motions were filed pursuant to Rule 50(b), 
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53(b), or Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, or Utah Code Annotated 77-13-6. Defendant, although presently incarcerated 
in the Utah State Prison, does not invoke Rule 4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
On April 9, 2003, Defendant-Appellant Jean Mallow was charged by Information 
before the Seventh District Court, Grand County, State of Utah with the offense of 
Distribution of a controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated 58-37-8. 
On September 26, 2003, Defendant was convicted, upon jury trial, of the above 
offense. 
On October 7, 2003, Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson, District Judge, over counsel's objection to proceeding with sentence without 
benefit of a pre-sentence investigation, and in reliance on an outdated report prepared out 
of state by an out-of-state agency, to serve an indeterminate term of incarceration in the 
Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen (15 ) years. A fine was also imposed and said 
sentence was ordered to run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by any other state. 
Defendant is presently serving a term of imprisonment pursuant to said sentence at the 
Utah State Prison. 
At jury trial herein, the State presented testimony from one Florence Beattie 
Christensen, a.k.a. Florence Carol Beattie, that she purchased methamphetamine from 
Defendant-appellant. Said witness was transported to Court from the Utah State Prison, 
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where she was then incarcerated. This, upon information and belief, was the only direct 
testimonial evidence of the charged transaction. 
Further, at the trial herein it was established upon direct and cross-examination of 
Ms. Beattie-Christensen and other witnesses, that Ms. Beattie-Christensen had been 
offered an accommodation by way of sentencing recommendation in exchange for her 
undercover C/I service, and testimony in this and other cases. Said testimony clearly 
establishes that defendant-appellant's attorney, one Andrew Fitzgerald, represented the 
State's chief witness in the very same proceedings in which she was being offered an 
accommodation for in part, in exchange for her testimony against Defendant-Appellant. 
Appellant takes the position that this was an impermissible conflict situation that renders 
the purported representation of Defendant-Appellant herein a fraud and a sham. 
At the conclusion of trial herein, on October 7,2003, Defendant was sentenced by 
the trial court without benefit of a pre-sentence investigation to a period of incarceration 
consecutive to that imposed by any other state. From that judgment of conviction and 
sentence, Defendant-Appellant brings this direct appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 9, 2003, Defendant-Appellant Jean Mallow was charged by Information 
before the Seventh District Court, Grand County, State of Utah with the offense of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated 58-37-8. 
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On September 26, 2003, Defendant was convicted, upon jury trial, of the above 
offense. 
On October 7, 2003, Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson, District Judge, over counsel's objection to proceeding with sentence without 
benefit of a pre-sentence investigation, and in reliance on an outdated report prepared out 
of state by an out-of-state agency, to serve an indeterminate term of incarceration in the 
Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen (15 ) years. (Sentencing Transcript, Tr. 5-9). A 
fine was also imposed and said sentence was ordered to run consecutive to any other 
sentence imposed by any other state. Defendant is presently serving a term of 
imprisonment pursuant to said sentence at the Utah State Prison. (Sentencing Transcript, 
Tr. 15). 
At jury trial herein, the State presented testimony from one Florence Beattie 
Christensen, a.k.a. Florence Carol Beattie, that she purchased methamphetamine from 
Defendant-appellant. Said witness was transported to Court from the Utah State Prison, 
where she was then incarcerated. (Tr. 85). This, upon information and belief, was the 
only direct testimonial evidence of the charged transaction. (Tr. 84, et. seq.). 
Ms. Christensen testified that she had known Defendant-Appellant for a long time, 
five years, that she had dated Ms. Mallow's brother and that she had no enmity towards 
Ms. Mallow. (Tr. 107). She testified that her services to police were provided in this 
case to set her life straight and in exchange for certain accommodations from the State in 
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exchange for her assistance. (Tr. 83, 95, 98, 99). 
Further, at trial herein, Ms. Christensen testified that she arranged the purchase of 
methamphetamine from Defendant-Appellant herself, in order to receive certain legal 
accommodations and benefits therefrom in exchange for her assistance to police. (Tr. 86-
87). She testified that she set up the buy herself and then contacted police to accompany 
her to make the buy. (Tr. 87). She testified that she made the buy herself directly from 
Defendant-Appellant Jean Mallow, in the quantity of one-quarter gram of 
methamphetamine and that she gave Defendant-Appellant cash payment in marked bills 
for said substance. (Tr. 88). 
The police witnesses who testified for the State herein testified that they were 
present at the time of the alleged controlled buy herein, that they provided marked bills 
for the purpose of said controlled buy, and that they met with the chief State's witness, 
Ms. Beattie-Christensen, both before and immediately after the buy, that they searched 
her and her vehicle and that she was not in possession of any drugs prior to the controlled 
transaction and that she was in possession of one quarter gram of methamphetamine 
immediately after the transaction. Although they monitored the transaction by wire, 
neither officer was able to substantiate that the voice appearing on the wire and on the 
tape made of the transaction was that of Defendant-Appellant Jean Mallow. (Tr. 21, 23, 
28,34,50-51,71). 
In addition to the above, the State offered testimony from its Drug Expert, one 
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Kevin Smith, that he received a purported bindle of the substance obtained in the 
controlled buy situation, that he tested said substance, and that he found said substance to 
contain methamphetamine. (Tr. 79-83, Exhibit 2 and 3). 
Further, at trial herein, Defendant-Appellant's counsel, one Andrew Fitzgerald, 
upon cross-examination of the State's chief witness, and only eye-witness, elicited 
testimony that he had previously represented the witness on a case in Grand County. 
(TR.93). Unbeknownst to Defendant-appellant at that time, this case, as it develops, was 
one of the same cases Ms. Beattie-Christensen, partly in exchange for her testimony 
against Appellant, had been offered accommodation and a recommendation in exchange 
for her undercover services and testimony. In direct examination by the prosecutor of 
Corporal Archie Walker, the chief narcotics officer involved in the case, the following 
colloquy is had: 
Q. Did you also agree that as far as her Grand County case, that you would agree 
to seek a recommendation of a small punishment for what she had done here? 
A. Yes, ma'am. (Tr. at 54-55) 
That this was the same case in which Mr. Fitzgerald represented the State's 
witness is established again in direct examination by Ms. Morgan at Tr. 91: 
Q. So you're currently serving a commitment for the case that brought you in 
touch with Archie Walker? 
A. Yes, I am. 
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Q. And that's a felony conviction, isn't it? 
A. Yes. It's a zero to five felony conviction. 
Q. And do you recall what the exact crime was that you're serving the time for? 
A. Possession of traceable amounts of Ritalin and drug paraphernalia. (Tr. at 
91). 
Thus, the transcript and record of this case establish clearly that Defense-counsel, 
Mr. Fitzgerald had represented both Defendant-Appellant and the State's chief witness 
and that he represented his client, Ms. Beattie-Christensen in the same case in which she 
was being offered a sentencing recommendation or accommodation partly in exchange for 
testimony against his client Jean Mallow, Defendant-Appellant herein. (Tr.91). 
At the conclusion of trial herein, on October 7, 2003, Defendant was sentenced by 
the trial court, without benefit of a Pre-sentence investigation, to a period of incarceration 
in the Utah State Prison, said judgment and sentence to be consecutive to that imposed by 
any other state. From that Judgment of Conviction Defendant-Appellant brings this 
direct appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's counsel was inappropriately conflicted herein inasmuch as he 
represented both Defendant-appellant and the chief witness against Defendant-appellant 
on one of the very cases the witness was receiving accommodation for, partly in exchange 
for her testimony against Defendant Appellant. Additionally, the trial court erred in 
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proceeding to sentence Defendant-appellant without benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report and 
without access to current authentic information Regarding Defendant-Appellant. Finally, 
the evidence presented herein was and is legally insufficient to support Defendant's 
conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL HEREIN WAS INAPPROPRIATELY 
CONFLICTED IN HIS REPRESENTATION OF 
BOTH DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND 
THE CHIEF WITNESS AGAINST 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
At jury trial herein, the State presented testimony from one Florence Beattie-
Christensen, a.k.a. Florence Carol Beattie, that she purchased methamphetamine from 
Defendant-Appellant. Said witness was transported to Court from the Utah State Prison, 
where she was then incarcerated. This, upon information and belief, was the only direct 
testimonial evidence of the charged transaction. 
Defendant-Appellant's counsel, one Andrew Fitzgerald, upon cross-examination 
of the State's chief witness, and only eye-witness, elicited testimony that he had 
previously represented her on a case in Grand County. (TR.93). Unbeknownst to 
Defendant-Appellant at that time, this case, as it develops, was one of the same cases Ms. 
Beattie-Christensen partly in exchange for her testimony against Appellant, had been 
offered accommodation and a recommendation for in exchange for her undercover 
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services and testimony. In direct examination by the prosecutor of Corporal Archie 
Walker, the chief narcotics officer involved in the case, the following colloquy is had: 
Q. Did you also agree that as far as her Grand County case, that you would agree 
to seek a recommendation of a small punishment for what she had done here? 
A. Yes, ma'am. (Tr. at 54-55) 
That this was the same case in which Mr. Fitzgerald represented the State's 
witness is established again in direct examination by Ms. Morgan at Tr. 91: 
Q. So you're currently serving a commitment for the case that brought you in 
touch with Archie Walker? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And that's a felony conviction, isn't it? 
A. Yes. It's a zero to five felony conviction. 
Q. And do you recall what the exact crime was that you're serving the time for? 
A. Possession of traceable amounts of Ritalin and drug paraphernalia. (Tr. at 
91; See also Appendix E). 
It is well established as a matter of law that an accused in a criminal matter is 
entitled under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to be 
represented by vigorous, independent counsel at every stage of the proceedings against 
the accused, and that counsel must exercise his serious responsibility to Defendant in a 
manner consistent with the rights and interests of Defendant. U.S. Constitution, 
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Amendment VI; State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah, 1997); State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 
911 (Utah 1993); State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190 (Ut. App., 1991); State v. FFe&6, 790 
P.2d 65 (Ut. App. 1990); State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918 (Ut. App., 1990). 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory (process)for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to the assistance of counsel for his defense... 
Thus a criminal defendant's right to counsel is established and set forth by the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808 
(Ut. 1997). If the accused is indigent, he is entitled, as here, to court appointed counsel. 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917. "The right to have the assistance of counsel at trial is 
a fundamental constitutional right jealously protected by the trial Court." Id. Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 84 S.Ct. L.Ed. 2d 799 (1963). Under our system of 
justice, the right to counsel includes the right to be represented by strong, independent 
counsel whose effectiveness is not undermined by conflicts of interest. 
In State v. Webb, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals enunciated the legal standard 
applicable to the instant situation: 
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel includes the right to counsel free from conflicts of 
interest... Ordinarily, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel must be analyzed under the two-pronged test set forth 
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in Strickland. Under that standard, a criminal defendant must 
show both that his counsel's performance was deficient and 
that it prejudiced his defense. However, a sixth amendment 
claim grounded on conflict of interest is a special subtype of 
ineffectiveness claim, which must be examined under a 
somewhat different standard. (Ibid, at 72) 
Because the alleged conflict in this case was not 
adequately raised in the trial court until after his conviction, 
Webb can succeed on his sixth amendment ineffectiveness of 
counsel claim only if he demonstrates both that counsel 
actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's 
performance. 
In order to show an actual conflict of interest existed, a 
defendant must point to specific instances in the record to 
suggest an actual conflict or impairment of his or her interests 
. . . There is no violation where the conflict is irrelevant or 
merely hypothetical; there must be an actual, significant 
conflict. (Ibid, at 75). 
In State v. Humphrey, supra, this Court further stated: 
We next turn to the actual conflict standard as 
articulated in Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 849, 100 S.Ct. At 1718. 
Defendant has the burden to show with some specificity that 
an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
representation. 
Defendant must show that counsel actively represented 
conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance . . . (Ibid at 923) 
Applying the rationale of the above cited cases to the facts in the instant case, it is 
clear that Defendant's counsel herein was conflicted in representing both Defendant-
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Appellant and the chief witness, and only eye-witness, against Defendant-Appellant. This 
is particularly clear in this situation where Appellant's counsel represented the State's 
chief witness in certain of the very proceedings in which she was being offered a 
sentencing accommodation in exchange for her services in this and other cases. 
It should also be noted that the record herein is silent with respect to this clear 
conflict situation. Nothing in the record indicates that Defendant-appellant was aware, 
(which she was not), that her counsel had represented the chief witness against her in the 
very same case in which she was seeking accommodation from the authorities in 
exchange for her trial testimony against Defendant. No waiver is found in the file. So far 
as counsel can determine, no record was ever made on this point. Indeed, it appears not 
to have been noticed or considered by anyone until Appellate counsel dredged it up from 
the Transcript. Clearly, the conflicted counsel, Mr. Fitzgerald appears never to have 
disclosed this information either to the Court or to Defendant. Presumably, the State's 
Attorney, Ms. Morgan, because of her involvement in both proceedings must have been 
aware of this situation, either as it was developing or as it developed. She, too, appears to 
have taken no action in the premises. This Court should immediately redress this clear 
Sixth Amendment violation, vacate and set aside the Judgment of Conviction and 
Sentence, and remand this matter for a new trial. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED HEREIN IN PROCEEDING TO SENTENCE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A PRE-
SENTENCE REPORT AND WITHOUT ACCESS TO 
CURRENT, AUTHENTIC INFORMATION 
REGARDING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT 
It is well established as a matter of law that a Defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
entitled to fundamental due process protections during the sentencing process. Said 
fundamental due process protections have been construed by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, this and other courts to include the right to be privy to information received 
and reviewed by the sentencing court and the right to review, and respond to and rebut 
erroneous allegations and information contained therein so that the sentencing process is, 
to the extent reasonably possible, grounded upon authentic, accurate and reasonably 
reliable information. United States ex. Rel. Collins, (C.A. 3 Pa.) 204 F.2d 264; State v. 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah, 1980); State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853 (Utah S. Ct., 1994); 
State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53 (Utah, 1981); Shield v. Nevada, 634 P.2d 469 (Nev. S. Ct., 
2982); State v. Skaff, 447 N.W. 2d 84 (Wise, C.A., 1989); Scott v. Maryland, 426 A.2d 
923 (Maryland Ct. App. 1981); State v. Tanner, 332 S.E. 2d 277 (W. Va. S. Ct., 1985); 21 
AmJur. 2d., Criminal Law, Section 596; 3 L. Ed. 2d 1808, Due Process Requirements of 
Presentence Procedure. 
In State v. Gomez, supra, the Supreme Court of the State of 
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Utah stated: 
"Due process, as guaranteed by both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions, requires criminal proceedings to be 
conducted to insure that the decision-making process is based 
upon accurate and reasonably reliable information. Thus, a 
defendant is entitled to due process protections during 
sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness. Fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a 
defendant have the right to examine and challenge the 
accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which 
his sentence is based." (Ibid, at 854, 855). 
Similarly, in State v. Lipsky, supra, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah again 
stated: 
"In sum, there is no doubt that the conviction of a criminal 
offense itself, without consideration of the punishment, 
represents a societal condemnation against an individual that 
may be a painful, humiliating, and degrading experience. The 
great majority of our laws and rules of evidence pertaining to 
criminal trials seek to guarantee those accused of criminal 
conduct their constitutional right to a fair trial insofar as the 
determination of guilt is concerned. Fewer safeguards exist 
which insure fairness in the punishment phase, even though it 
is the punishment which in fact often has a far more profound 
impact on a person than the finding of guilt. The fair 
administration of justice at the least requires that the 
information upon which the judge relies in imposing 
punishment is accurate." (Ibid, at 1249). 
Applying the above-cited cases and authority to the facts in the instant case, it is 
clear that no Pre-Sentence Report was prepared herein by Adult Probation and Parole 
precedent to imposition of sentence, that the trial court received and reviewed prior to 
imposition of sentence, at the behest of the State, an outdated and inaccurate "report" 
prepared by an out-of-state agency, and that the impact of said inaccurate and prejudicial 
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information was such that it compromised the integrity of the sentencing process in this 
case and contaminated the objectivity of the sentencing judge. As noted in many if not 
most of the above-cited cases, the sentencing process must be grounded upon authentic, 
accurate and reasonably reliable information in order to meet the requirements of 
fundamental due process, as enunciated in the above cited cases. And even assuming, 
arguendo, that the trial court below correctly permitted consideration of the objected to 
foreign Pre-Sentence Report, and that there was no error in so doing, there yet remains the 
collateral issue of whether Defendant-Appellant was accorded a meaningful opportunity 
to respond to and rebut same. We submit that she was not. 
Our position is, quite simply, that there can be no doubt that the above-said 
improperly received and considered materials and information contaminated the 
sentencing process herein and contaminated the objectivity of the sentencing court, in 
derogation of Defendant-Appellant's right to fundamental due process protections during 
the sentencing process. Further, our position is that this Court cannot permit such a 
travesty as this to pass unchallenged because it constitutes a challenge to the rational and 
logical underpinnings of our judicial system. The courts are one of the few remaining 
havens of reason, logic and objectivity remaining. The calm of temperate and rational 
judicial deliberation must not and cannot be permitted to be disrupted by the emotionally 
charged over-reaching of those who seek to inflame and prejudice those calm 
deliberations by the introduction of irrational elements into the sentencing process. The 
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legal process must remain a fortress of rationality and calm deliberation and must not be 
permitted to degenerate into a vehicle for recrimination and revenge. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED HEREIN WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION 
It is well established as a matter of law that the totality of the evidence in a 
criminal case must be sufficient to support the conviction of defendant beyond all 
reasonable doubt and that a failure on the part of the State's evidence to so establish 
requires the acquittal of defendant. State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1147 (Utah, 1989); State v. 
Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123 (Utah, 1989); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utaih, 1991); State v. 
Lamm, 606 P.2d 231 (Utah, 1980); State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah, 1992). 
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, the Appellate 
Court does not sit as a second fact finder, determine guilt or innocence, or otherwise 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231; State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991). The jury alone weighs the evidence and determines the 
credibility of witnesses. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231. Accordingly, when reviewing an 
insufficiency claim, the Appellate Court' View[s] the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury verdict." State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah, 1992). 
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The Court will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence "only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superceded 
by rule on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). In other words, the 
Court will sustain a jury verdict so long as there is "any evidence or reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from the evidence from which the jury could make findings of all the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 860 
(Utah 1992). 
In this case the evidence was clearly insufficient such that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt in weighing and considering the evidence. In 
evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence this Court looks at the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). A jury conviction is 
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. Id. 
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d, 1123, 1128 (Utah 1989). 
In the instant case, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
the evidence is so inconclusive and inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
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have entertained a reasonable doubt herein. The State's chief witness, and only eye 
witness was a convicted felon with a long (and admitted) history of drug involvement, 
and her testimony was only elicited in exchange for substantial consideration. The 
purported "controlled buy" herein was a joke inasmuch as no thorough search of the 
undercover C.I. was made, nor could have been made, by supporting officers, because of 
her sex. The purported "marked bills" were never recovered from Defendant-Appellant 
nor anyone else, and the monitoring officers, by their own admission, were not in a 
position to monitor or observe the transaction or its aftermath. Add to this mix, the 
history of enmity between Defendant-Appellant and the witness and there you have it: 
Reasonable minds must have entertained doubt about the veracity and credibility of the 
purported chief witness and must have entertained a reasonable doubt that Defendant-
Appellant committed this crime. Thus, the jury verdict herein can only be seen as an 
unfortunate aberration. 
Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests that this Court review, weigh and 
consider the evidence herein, applying the standards of the above cited cases and 
authority to the established facts. Defendant-Appellant is confident the Court, applying 
the standards of Petree, Walker, Johnson and Cobb, can only conclude that the evidence 
adduced herein was legally insufficient to support Defendant's conviction. This Court 
should reverse the judgment of conviction and sentence herein and remand this matter for 
a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's counsel was inappropriately conflicted herein inasmuch as he 
represented both Defendant-Appellant and the chief witness against Defendant-Appellant 
on one of the very cases the witness was receiving accommodation for, partly in exchange 
for her testimony against Defendant-Appellant. Additionally, the trial court erred in 
proceeding to sentence Defendant-Appellant, over objection of counsel, without benefit 
of a Pre-Sentence Report and without access to current authentic information regarding 
Defendant-Appellant. Finally, the evidence presented herein was and is legally 
insufficient to support Defendant's conviction. This Court should vacate and set aside the 
judgment of conviction and sentence herein and remand this matter for a new trial. 
DATED this b v day of May 2004. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the S """ day of May 2004,1 personally hand 
delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant 
Christopher D. Ballard, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
-ILED 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT ^Y-
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APR 0 9 2003 
:,LERK OF THE COURT 
Deputy 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEAN MALLOW, 
AKA ALICE LAJEAN FINNEY, 
AKA JEAN CRAIN, 
AKA JEAN DIEHL, 
DOB: 07/18/1964 
Defendant . 
Oi 
NO. ^ r r c 1 
INFORMATION 
L_l 
THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT, HAPPY J. MORGAN, states on 
information and belief that the defendant committed, in the 
above-named county, the crimes of: 
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a SECOND DEGREE FELONY, 
in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, in that the said defendant, on or about 
September 22, 2 002, at Grand County, State of Utah, did 
distribute, or agree, consent, offer or arrange to distribute a 
controlled substance, i.e. methamphetamine. 
^ J 
This information is based upon evidence received from 
the following witnesses: Grand/San Juan Strike Foirce. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 2003. 
Happy J. Morgan 
Grand County Attorney 
Appendix B. 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE 
^
E0
 OCT 0 7 2003 
CLERK OF THE CaURT 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT r-puty y ~~ 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Criminal No. 0317-094 
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Moab, Grand 
County, State of Utah, on October 07, 2003, present the Honorable 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Against: JEAN MALLOW, aka Alice LaJean Finney, Jean Crain, Jean 
Diehl, 
DOB: 07/18/1964 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON 
Happy J. Morgan for Plaintiff 
Tom Jones for Defendant 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing 
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court 
and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore been 
found guilty by a jury of the offense of: 
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Second Degree Felony, 
and the defendant staring 10 uhe Court that rhere is no legal 
reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the 
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as 
follows, to-wit: That you, JEAN MALLOW, are hereby imprisoned in 
the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term of NOT LESS THAN ONE (1) YEAR 
1 
NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS. You are further ORDERED to pay 
a fine and assessment in the total amount of $1,850.00 and pay 
restitution to Grand County for the services of your public 
defender in the amount of $500.00. 
Said prison term is to be served consecutively to any 
other sentence imposed by any other state. 
You are hereby REMANDED to the custody of the Grand 
County Sheriff or other proper officer for transfer to the 
custody of the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this / 7^ day of _±jO_ ^>cU\>f 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Happy J. Morgan 
Grand County Attorney 
Ly2r£ R. Anderson 
district Court Judg^K ^A^OO^ ^J/S^ 
HS^'CTCO^ 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the ~H^~day of (^) !^7rr / 
2003, I hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the above to Tom Jones, Attorney for Defendant, 
211 East Broadway, #217, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Department 
of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, 1165 S. Hwy. 191, St. 
3, Moab, Utah 84532; Grand County Sheriff, 125 E. Center, Moab, 
Utah 84532. do * f\v\0 *C^y . 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 031700094 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail TOM JONES 
ATTORNEY DEF 
211 EAST 3 00 SOUTH 
SUITE 217 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Fax UTAH STATE PRISON 
By Hand 
By Hand 
By Hand 
Dated this 2^ day of OAL 
HAPPY J MORGAN 
AP&P 
GRAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
OFFICE 
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Appendix C. 
FULL TEXT OF DISPOSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS HEREIN CITED 
Amend. I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 438 
f »i»«irt»i;i 
CHARLES COTESWORTH 
PINCKNEY, 
CHARLES PINCKNEY, 
PIERCE BUTLER. 
W 11.1.1 AM F E W . 
ABR BALDWIN. 
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787. 
Present The States of 
New Hampshire. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. 
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is 
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should after-
wards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the 
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent 
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting 
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof 
to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, 
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall 
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in 
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Elec-
tors should be appointed by the States which shall 
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Elec-
tors should assemble to vote for the President, and 
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings un-
der this Constitution. That after such Publication the 
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and 
Representatives elected: That the Electors should 
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their Votes certified, 
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution re-
quires, to the Secretary of the United States in Con-
gress assembled, that the Senators and Representa-
tives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; 
that the Senators should appoint a President of the 
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and 
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he 
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the Pres-
ident, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution. 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENT 11 
(Right to bear arms.] 
A w«ll rrculntrd Militin. bfMnc n f^" «?v 1o ihr 5^ . 
ctmty o( ;\ !><*<• Stntc, the right <»l tin- |»"nple hi keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringH 
AMENDMENT III 
(Quartering soldiers.l 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, W quartered m 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
(Unreasonable searches and scizures.l 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, an<! particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
(Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or puhlic danger, nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.! 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the^State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to he informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENTS IX (BILL OF RIGHTS1 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
AMENDMENT I 
(Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT VII 
(Trial by jury In civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
•hall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
(Bail 
AMENDMENT VIII 
Punishment] 
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(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the 
required information is not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection 
(l2XaXvi) shall be deposited in the General Fund as a 
dedicated credit to be used by the division under Subsec-
tion 58-37-7.7(1). 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this Subsection (12) shall be in accordance with Section 
58-1-108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the 
division. 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the 
database in accordance with this section may not be held 
civilly liable for having submitted the information. 
(14) All department and the division costs necessary to 
establish and operate the database shall be funded by appro-
priations from: 
(a) the Commerce Service Fund; and 
(b) the General Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting 
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the 
submitting drug outlet. 2003 
58-37-7.7. Use of dedicated credits — Controlled Sub-
stance Database — Collection of penalt ies . 
(1) The director may, with concurrence of the Controlled 
Substance Database Advisory Committee created in Section 
58-37-7.5, use the monies deposited in the General Fund as a 
dedicated credit under Subsections 58-37-6(8Xa), 58-37-
7.5(llXc), and 58-37-7.5(12Xb) for the following purposes: 
(a) maintenance and replacement of the database 
equipment, including hardware and software; 
(b) training of staff; and 
(c) pursuit of external grants and matching funds. 
(2) The director of the division may collect any penalty 
imposed under Subsections 58-37-6X8)(a), 58-37-7.5(llXc), and 
58-37-7.5(12Xb) and which is not paid by: 
(a) referring the matter to the Office of State Debt 
Collection or a collection agency; or 
(b) bringing an action in the district court of the county 
in which the person owing the debt resides or in the 
county where the office of the director is located. 
(3) The director may seek legal assistance from the attor-
ney general or the county or district attorney of the district in 
which the action is brought to collect the fine. 
(4) The court shall award reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs to the division for successful collection actions under 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(5) All funding of the controlled substance database as 
denned under Section 58-37-7.5 is nonlapsing. 2003 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalt ies . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages 
in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d tha t is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervi-
sor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a 
controlled substance analog, or 
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III 
is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second 
or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse-
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if 
the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or 
in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeter-
minate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(lXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance analog or a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a 
valid prescription or order, directly from a practi-
tioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mar-
ijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2Xa)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that person 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsec-
tion (4)(c) who, in an offense not amounting to a violation 
of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and 
intentionally having in his body any measurable 
amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 
76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bod-
ily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death 
of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xf 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, 
person not authorized under this chapter who commit 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Titl 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or unde 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substance 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties an 
classifications under this Subsection (4) if the act i 
committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondar 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school o 
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any c 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta 
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at th 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsore 
by or through a school or institution under Subse< 
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-car 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, o 
recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship a 
defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadiun 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lc 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, c 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) throug 
(viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younge 
than 18 years of age, regardless of where the ac 
occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) i 
guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned fo 
a term of not less than five years if the penalty that woul 
otherwise have been established but for this subsectio 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition o 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and th 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have bee 
established would have been less than a first degre 
felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicte 
under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty < 
one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribe 
for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under thi 
Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed th 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of th 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nc 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location whef 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4X* 
or was unaware that the location where the act occurre 
was as described in Subsection (4Xa). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty i 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section i 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrt 
tive penalt}' or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a fedefl 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquitt* 
under federal law or the law of another state for the satf 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, ev 
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produce* 
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manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
*ke person or persons did so with knowledge of the character 
0f the substance or substances. 
(g) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not 
for humans, from prescribing, -dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this 
section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in 
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 2003 
68-37-8.5. Applicability of Title 76 prosecutions under 
this chapter. 
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters 
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this 
chapter. 1&97 
58-37-9. Investigators — Status of peace officers. 
Investigators for the Department of Commerce shall, for the 
purpose of enforcing the provisions of this chapter, have the 
status of peace officers. 1995 
68-37-10. Search warrants — Administrative inspec-
tion warrants — Inspections and seizures of 
property without warrant. 
(1) Search warrants relating to offenses involving con-
trolled substances may be authorized in the same manner as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 23. 
(2) Issuance and execution of administrative inspection 
warrants shall be as follows: 
(a) Any judge or magistrate of this state within his 
jurisdiction upon proper oath or affirmation showing 
probable cause, may issue warrants for the purpose of 
conducting administrative inspections authorized by this 
act or regulations thereunder and seizures of property 
appropriate to such inspections. Probable cause for pur-
poses of this act exists upon showing a valid public 
interest in the effective enforcement of the act or rules 
promulgated thereunder sufficient to justify administra-
tive inspection of the area, premises, building, or convey-
ance in the circumstances specified in the application for 
the warrant. 
(b) A warrant shall issue only upon an affidavit of an 
officer or employee duly designated and having knowledge 
of the facts alleged sworn to before a judge or magistrate 
which establish the grounds for issuing the warrant. If 
the judge or magistrate is satisfied that grounds for the 
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe 
they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the area, 
premises, building, or conveyance to be inspected, the 
purpose of the inspection, and if appropriate, the type of 
property to be inspected, if any. The warrant shall: 
(i) state the grounds for its issuance and the name 
of each person whose affidavit has been taken to 
support it; 
(ii) be directed to a person authorized by Section 
58-37-9 of this act to execute it; 
(iii) command the person to whom it is directed to 
inspect the area, premises, building, or conveyance 
identified for the purpose specified and if appropriate, 
direct the seizure of the property specified; 
(iv) identify the item or types of property to be 
seized, if any; 
(v) direct that it be served during normal business 
hours and designate the judge or magistrate to whom 
it shall be returned. 
(c) A warrant issued pursuant to this section must be 
executed and returned within ten days after its date 
unless, upon a showing of a need for additional time, the 
court instructs otherwise in the warrant If property is 
seized pursuant to a warrant, the person executing the 
warrant shall give to the person from whom or from 
whose premises the property was taken a copy of the 
warrant and a receipt for the property taken or leave the 
copy and receipt at the place where the property was 
taken. Return of the warrant shall be made promptly and 
be accompanied by a written inventory of any property 
taken. The inventory shall be made in the presence of the 
person executing the warrant and of the person from 
whose possession or premises the property was taken, if 
they are present, or in the presence of at least one credible 
person other than the person executing the warrant. A 
copy of the inventory shall be delivered to the person from 
whom or from whose premises the property was taken 
and to the applicant for the warrant. 
(d) The judge or magistrate who issued the warrant 
under this section shall attach a copy of the return and all 
other papers to the warrant and file them with the court. 
(3) The department is authorized to make administrative 
inspections of controlled premises in accordance with the 
following provisions: 
(a) For purposes of this section only, "controlled pre-
mises" means: 
(i) Places where persons licensed or exempted from 
licensing requirements under this act are required to 
keep records. 
(ii) Places including factories, warehouses, estab-
lishments, and conveyances where persons licensed 
or exempted from licensing requirements are permit-
ted to possess, manufacture, compound, process, sell, 
deliver, or otherwise dispose of any controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) When authorized by an administrative inspection 
warrant a law enforcement officer or employee designated 
in Section 58-37-9, upon presenting the warrant and 
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in 
charge, has the right to enter controlled premises for the 
purpose of conducting an administrative inspection. 
(c) When authorized by an administrative inspection 
warrant, a law enforcement officer or employee desig-
nated in Section 58-37-9 has the right: 
(i) l b inspect and copy records required by this act. 
(ii) l b inspect within reasonable limits and a rea-
sonable manner, the controlled premises and all per-
tinent equipment, finished and unfinished material, 
containers, and labeling found, and except as pro-
vided in Subsection (3He), all other things including 
records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facili-
ties subject to regulation and control by this act or by 
rules promulgated by the department. 
(iii) To inventory and stock of any controlled sub-
stance and obtain samples of any substance. 
(d) This section shall not be construed to prevent the 
inspection of books and records without a warrant pursu-
911 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 24 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's 
brief Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit a 
motion to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief In no 
event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after oral 
argument Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any 
time if the claim has been raised and the motion would have 
been available to a party 
(b) Content of motion, response, reply The content of the 
motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule 23 The 
motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging 
facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the 
claimed deficient performance of the attorney The affidavits 
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered 
by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient perfor 
mance The motion shall also be accompanied by a proposed 
order or remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and 
specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be 
addressed on remand 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is 
filed The response shall include a proposed order of remand 
that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the 
factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by 
the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the 
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party 
Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is 
filed 
(c) Order of the court If the requirements of parts (a) and 
(b) of this rule have been met, the court may order that the 
case be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the 
purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel The order of remand shall 
identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual 
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the trial 
court The order shall also direct the trial court to complete the 
proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order 
of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for 
a delay of reasonable length 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's 
attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest 
upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw 
and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or 
retained 
(d) Effect on appeal Oral argument and the deadlines for 
bnefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand 
under this rule Other procedural steps required by these 
rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay 
is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the 
parties or upon the court's motion 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial 
court shall promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as 
necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel Any claims of 
ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not 
be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial 
court determines that the interests of justice or judicial 
efficiency require consideration of issues not specifically iden 
tified in the order of remand Evidentiary hearings shall be 
conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after 
remand The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the 
proponent of the fact The standard of proof shall be a 
preponderance of the evidence The trial court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient per 
formance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by 
appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand 
Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of 
entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court finds good 
cause for a delay of reasonable length 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record At the conclu 
sion of all proceedings before the trial court the clerk of the 
trial court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare 
the record of the supplemental proceedings as required by 
these rules If the record of the original proceedings before the 
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court the 
clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record 
of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the 
supplemental record If the record of the original proceedings 
before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the 
supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of the entire 
record 
(g) Appellate court determination Upon receipt of the 
record from the trial court the clerk of the court shall notify 
the parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument 
under these rules Errors claimed to have been made during 
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors 
in other appeals The findings of fact entered pursuant to this 
rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of 
findings of fact in other appeals 
Rule 24. Briefs 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order mdi 
cated 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal 
contains the names of all such parties The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the 
cover 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the 
addendum, with page references 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically ar 
ranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief 
where they are cited 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, in 
eluding for each issue the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority, and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court, or 
(aX5XB) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out 
verbatim with the appropriate citation If the pertinent part of 
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the bnef under 
paragraph (11) of this rule 
(a)(7) A statement of the case The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the ca 3e, the course of proceed 
ings, and its disposition in the court below A statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow 
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below 
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of this rule 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, 
suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the 
arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not 
be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument 
is arranged 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the con-
tentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evi-
dence that supports the challenged finding. 
(aXlO) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(aXll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no 
addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum 
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the 
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound sepa-
rately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The 
addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or 
regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(HXB) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of 
the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of 
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court 
as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(aXllXC) those parts of the record on appeal that are of 
central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as 
the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the 
appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(bX2) an addendum, except to provide material not in-
cluded in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may 
refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the 
brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, 
the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply 
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth 
in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and 
(10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with 
leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected 
in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
references to parties by such designations as "appellant'' and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," 
"the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be 
made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant 
to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 
11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover 
page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom 
right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to 
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the tran-
scriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit 
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of 
which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of 
the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and 
received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, 
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs 
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the 
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the 
record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth 
the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal 
is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed 
the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless 
the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The 
brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The 
brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues 
and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the 
answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50 
pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which 
contains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response 
to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The 
appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 pages in length. 
The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appel-
lee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this 
rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities, and 
addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the court. 
The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause 
shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or 
appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or 
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the 
appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of 
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent 
and significant authorities come to the attention of a party 
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument 
but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of 
the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An 
original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the 
Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page 
of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations 
pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the 
reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be 
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule 
must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged 
with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not m 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer. 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem 
representing a minor who is not a party to the appeal may be 
filed only if accompanied by written consent of all parties, or 
by leave of court granted on motion or at the request of the 
court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of the 
applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as a' 
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or guardian a 
litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party 
whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae 
or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cause 
shown otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus curiae o 
guardian ad litem to participate in the oral argument will o* 
granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretio 
